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Causal Peer Effects in Police Misconduct 
We estimate causal peer effects in police misconduct using data from about 35,000 
officers and staff from London’s Metropolitan Police Service for the period 2011-2014. We 
use instrumental variable techniques and exploit the variation in peer misconduct that results 
when officers switch peer groups. We find that a 10% increase in prior peer misconduct 
increases an officer’s later misconduct by 8%. As the police are empowered to enforce the 
law and protect individual liberties, integrity and fairness in policing are essential for 
establishing and maintaining legitimacy and public consent1-5. Understanding the antecedents 
of misconduct will help develop interventions that reduce misconduct. 
Uncertainty still exists on the influence of peers on unethical behaviour in real-world 
settings including policing. Previous research is limited to short-term or cross-sectional 
studies, which prevents inference about causality in peer misconduct. Our data, however, 
follows employees over time as they change roles and identifies their peers and their 
supervisors, allowing us to estimate reliable causal relationships. We estimate how officers 
are affected by the misconduct cases of their peers. Our estimation of these peer effects 
complements the existing literature, in which there is much work on how individual 
deviances predict misconduct and how organizational, social, and situational factors affect 
misconduct. Our estimation also provides new insights outside the American context, where 
most of the literature to date is concentrated. 
The study of individual deviance within police is appealing because of the long-
established fact that the majority of incidents of corruption, brutality or excessive use of force 
are accounted by a handful of officers or “rotten apples”.  For example, in the US, the 
Christopher Commission that investigated the Los Angeles Police Department found that, 
over the period 1987 to 1991, 5% of the officers (of nearly 6000) were responsible for 20% of 
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all reports of excessive use of force6. In the UK, in 1997 the then Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police Service Sir Paul Condon famously stated that there were up to 100-250 
seriously corrupt officers in the Service (then, of about 27,000 officers)7,8. That a few officers 
are responsible for much of the misconduct raises two possibilities: First, identifying and 
removing, or otherwise preventing, misconduct from this small number of officers would 
have a large effect. Second, and more worryingly, in the presence of strong peer effects, 
when the bad apples are not identified and disciplined, corruption can become pervasive and 
organized.  
Research focused on individual deviances shows that complaint-prone officers are 
more likely to be non-white9-11, male, less experienced11-14 and less educated10,15. Research 
also shows that black officers have an earlier onset of misconduct, prior military service 
appears to delay the onset, and neither education nor academy performance affected the 
timing of onset16. Recent work has also sought to understand the relationship between 
personality and misconduct. Donner and Jennings17, for instance, have shown that low self-
control is a key predictor of engagement in general misconduct, particularly related to 
physical and verbal abuse. In the same vein, Pogarsky and Piquero18 found that impulsivity 
mediates the influence of legal and extra-legal sanctions on the decision to commit 
hypothetical acts of misconduct.  
In contrast to the individual deviance view, research on organizational correlates of 
police misconduct is sparse. Some case studies have documented evidence of the influence of 
the police departments’ characteristics, such as size, bureaucracy and professionalism on the 
decision to arrest (for a review see Dunham & Alpert19). More recent evidence has shown 
that officers who perceive fairness in managerial practices are less likely to justify noble-
cause corruption or adhere to the code of silence that protects bad cops20. Some consideration 
has also been given to situational variables. For instance, the possibility of arrest at police-
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citizen encounters escalates with the mere presence of supervisors21,22 and officers use greater 
levels of force against suspects encountered in high-crime and disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods23.  
The understanding of deviance behaviour should not neglect social aspects. People 
making decisions inside organizations are constrained by authority rules and regulations, but 
are also constrained by social norms, cultural expectations, and considerable peer-group 
pressures. Kohlberg’s research on moral reasoning24 has shown that, unlike childhood (when 
children were more concerned about the physical consequences of their actions, i.e., 
punishments and rewards, and when elements of reciprocity and fairness started to be 
incorporated pragmatically), moral reasoning in adolescence and adulthood is typically 
determined by beliefs about what others will think is right or wrong. In this level of moral 
thinking (termed as ‘conventional’ by the author) the individuals try to conform to the natural 
or accepted behaviour. For a discussion on how colleagues influence organizational ethics, 
see Treviño et al.25  
Compelling evidence for the existence of peer effects has already been documented in 
other settings: For example, Mas and Moretti26 found that the productivity of cashiers in a 
supermarket chain increases with the effort of co-workers who face them, Zimmerman 
demonstrated that first-year college students in the middle of the SAT distribution who share 
a room with students in the bottom of the distribution do worse in grades27, and Trogdon, 
Nonnemaker, and Pais provided evidence that weight gain spreads through peer networks28. 
Herbst and Mas29 provide a meta-analysis of peer effects in co-worker productivity: across 
studies they find an increase in a co-worker’s productivity causes an effect about 12% of the 
size in their peers. Herbst and Mas also show a consistency between effect sizes in the field 
and from laboratory experiments.  
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But although peer influences have been subject to analysis in various domains via 
both lab and field studies, surprisingly, much uncertainty still exists on the influence of peers 
in police ethics and integrity. The police misconduct literature already suggests an 
association, but the evidence falls short of supporting a causal link. For example, officers 
assigned to the same workgroup tend to share occupational attitudes due to their interactions 
and exposure to similar environments30. This shows correlation in attitudes, but not a causal 
link. In the Philadelphia Police Department, officers who thought that their peers considered 
the use of excessive force as less serious were more likely to have citizen complaints, as were 
officers who anticipated more minor punishment for theft31. Using the officers’ judgments of 
their peers’ attitudes, while ignoring the dynamics of peer group networks, allows again only 
a correlational but not a causal claim. In the Dallas Police Department, one quarter of the 
variation in trainees’ subsequent allegations of misconduct was attributed to field training 
officers in a multilevel analysis nesting trainees with their field training officers32. 
Nevertheless, this multilevel analysis is likely to be driven by common variance elements that 
are typical in nested structures and thus do not reflect causal relationships—again, because 
unobserved, and so omitted, shocks occurring among trainees’ groups who share a common 
environment can mask peer effects. 
Estimating social learning is challenging as individuals from a peer group affect their 
peer group as much as the peer group affects them. In addition to this reflection problem, peer 
groups are not necessarily randomly sorted, as high-performance workers could be allocated 
to a high-performance peer group, and so workers from the same peer group might likely 
share common unobserved characteristics. Moreover, members of a group might show 
similar misconduct because they are subject to similar shocks33. In our econometric approach, 
we address these issues using the instrumental variable estimation technique. We exploit the 
variation in peer quality that results after workers change line managers and switch peer 
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groups. Misconduct of the new peers acquired following the change is instrumented with 
prior events of misconduct of their new peers’ peers, allowing us to estimate the causal effect 
between peers.  
We should note that by examining peer effects, we do not intend to engage in the 
debate of which specific mechanisms are driving these effects. Nor do our data allow us to 
distinguish between the mechanisms by which peer effects are mediated. For example, we 
will not discriminate between social influences motivated by learning about what behaviour 
is best to follow given the individuals’ own needs or motivated by pure peer pressure and 
social conformity. In fact, due to the difficulty to discriminate between these mechanisms, 
most research in the peer effects literature have focused on measuring the magnitude of peer 
effects only and have overlooked the mechanisms that may be generating the peer effects.  
Our data covers four years of allegations of misconduct, from 2011 to 2014, for 
49,403 officers and staff. For analysis we required line manager history (from which we can 
infer peer groups), at least one peer, and demographic information. This was true for 35,924 
officers and staff. Of these, 14,915 had records of one or more complaint during the period 
2011 to 2014. However, most of them (54%) received only 2 or fewer complaints in this four-
year interval (see Supplementary Figure 1).  Note that this is a very common pattern in police 
departments34, suggesting that misconduct is not systemic and apparently only a minority of 
officers (or roles) are complaint-prone. 
Allegations of misconduct are classified in seven categories: failures in duty, 
malpractice, discriminatory behaviour, oppressive behaviour, incivility, traffic, and other 
allegations (we merged these last two). Their distributions in Table 1 reveals that for both 
members of police staff and police officers, the most recurrent allegations consist of cases of 
failures in duty, which can be, for instance, unjustified use of the relevant power, 
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unauthorised entry on search, failure to inform detained persons of their rights and 
entitlements, failure to maintain proper custody/property records, interviewing oppressively 
or in inappropriate circumstances, among other cases. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The possible sanctions following misconduct are formal actions, unsatisfactory 
performance procedures, management actions, retirement, or resignation (though most 
complaints end in no sanction). Formal actions involve written warnings, while unsatisfactory 
performance procedures entail the organizational procedures designed to deal with 
unsatisfactory performance and attendance. Management actions refer to any action that can 
be locally resolved to handle the allegation of misconduct. They consist of, for example, the 
establishment of an improvement plan and the clarification of expectations for future 
conduct. Observe in Table 1 that very few cases received a formal disciplinary action. 
Furthermore, over 50% of allegations against members of police staff and about 90% of the 
allegations against police officers had no subsequent actions taken. Most of these allegations 
were instances in which, following investigation and based upon the available evidence, there 
was no case to answer concerning the allegation. It can then be argued that the allegations 
documented might over represent real events of misconduct. Nonetheless, research has shown 
that allegations are difficult to prove because of the relative lack of physical evidence and the 
absence of witnesses and, thus, cases deemed unsubstantiated do not necessarily imply the 
absence of police misconduct16,35. Note that the use of all allegations, irrespectively of their 
outcomes, is the usual approach adopted in the literature. 
Supplementary Table 1 shows how the types of allegations correlate within 
individuals. People with alleged failures in duty seem to also exhibit, to some extent, some 
form of incivility and oppressive or discriminatory behaviour. 
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We test whether workers’ peers’ misconduct might affect the recurrence of workers’ 
misconduct events. Peer groups were defined by linking officers and staff assigned to the 
same line manager. Our outcome is a binary variable,    , that equals one if worker   had an 
event of misconduct during quarter  . Our independent variable of interest is the proportion of 
peers of   in   − 1 receiving reports of misconduct in   − 1,         (   ). Since officers who 
patrol together or are in certain units together have a higher likelihood of being involved in 
reports of misconduct that might not be their fault, to prevent overestimating the effects of 
peers’ misconduct, we consider as events of peer misconduct only those episodes in which   
had no same-day concurrent allegations of misconduct. That is, allegations against peers and 
allegations against the target officer   correspond to different cases and were reported on 
different dates.   is a vector of control variables that include demographic characteristics, 
such as gender, length of service, employee’s business group, employee type, and employee 
performance; and additional controls for annual and seasonal effects. 
 [    = 1] =         (   ) +        (1) 
Empirically there are three challenges for the identification of peer effects33,36,37. First, 
due to non-random assignment into groups, individuals with similar characteristics may end 
up in the same group. Then what looks like peer effects could actually be due to common 
characteristics of the individuals themselves and not due to their peers.  Without random 
assignment, the influence of individual’s characteristics cannot be identified separately from 
the influence of their peer’s characteristics. The second challenge is that, even when random 
assignment had been possible, individuals in the same group share similar environments and, 
thus, there could be unobservable institutional factors affecting the group members’ 
performance simultaneously. These two threats are referred to in the literature as correlated 
effects and do not correspond to any social phenomenon between peers. Third, we would 
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expect peer effects to be bi-directional. This means that peer effects are, in part, a property of 
the target individual and are not exogenous to the individual. This reverse causality problem 
holds even if we had random assignment into groups.  
To address these challenges, we proceed as follows. To absorb the effect of 
unobservable institutional factors affecting the likelihood to misbehave either because some 
workers are exposed to particular stressful environments or high crime areas, or because 
workers sharing some background characteristics preferred to join specific business groups, 
our econometric specification includes dummy variable controls for the business groups the 
employees belong to. These business groups consist of: Territorial Police (divided in 
Boroughs North, Boroughs South, Boroughs West, Central, Criminal Justice & Crime, and 
Westminster), Specialist Crime and Operations, Specialist Operations, and Other Business 
Group (which aggregate the groups Career Transition, Deputy Commissioners Portfolio, 
Directorate of Resources, Met HQ, National Functions and Shared Support Services). Our 
regressions also include quarter and year dummies to account for any seasonal fluctuation in 
crime.  
To deal with individual heterogeneity, we also include controls for gender, years of 
length of service, employee type and police ranks, and police performance. Performance 
scores are reported on an annual basis in Performance Development Reviews and evaluate 
competencies in operational effectiveness, organizational influence, and resource 
management. To alleviate the concerns of simultaneity bias, note that we estimate the effect 
of lagged peer outcomes on misconduct. More importantly, to deal with endogenous worker 
sorting into peer groups and potential correlated effects unaccounted by our set of controls, 
we use instrumental variable techniques and estimate a linear probability model using two-
step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators.  Our identification strategy 
exploits the variation in peers that is experienced by workers who switch peer groups.  
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Figure 1 illustrates the procedure followed. The top panel shows the hypothetical 
composition of peer groups for three different line managers across the quarters in one year, 
from   − 3 to  . We are interested in modelling the risk of misconduct of individual 
  (denoted as ‘T’, for target individual, from now on) at time  . ‘T’ is allocated to a new line 
manager, Line Manager 2, in quarter   − 1 and encounters new peers, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, and 
‘H’. First, we look at his new peers and select those that were also recently allocated to Line 
Manager 2 (i.e., ‘H’).  Second, for the identified peer ‘H’, we observe his existing peers in 
  − 2 (‘I’, ‘J’, and ‘K’) and compute the proportion of these existing peers who had reports of 
misconduct in   − 2 (P1). Likewise, we also observe his existing peers in   − 3 (again, ‘I’, ‘J’ 
and ‘K’) and compute the proportion of these existing peers who had reports of misconduct in 
  − 3 (P2). These two measures P1 and P2 are used as instruments of         (   ) in 
Equation 1. Note that the construction of our instruments ignores the behaviour of any worker 
that was under the supervision of Line Manager 2 during   − 2 and   − 3, such as workers 
‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, and ‘G’, since due to potential non-random sorting these workers might share 
some background characteristics with ‘T’.  
Valid instruments satisfy two properties. The instrument must be (1) relevant: the 
instrument must be correlated strongly with the endogenous variable         (   ). The 
instrument must satisfy the (2) exclusion restriction: the instrument must affect the outcome 
variable,    , only through its effect on the endogenous variable. That is, the instrument 
should not affect independently the outcome variable    . The exclusion restriction required 
for identification implies that misconduct of the peers of ‘H’ in   − 2 and   − 3 (i.e., 
misconduct of ‘I’, ‘J’, and ‘K’) should not affect the current behaviour of ‘T’ except through 
their impact on ‘H’ in   − 1. If ‘H’ had not been allocated to Line Manager 2, the behaviour 
of ‘I’, ‘J’, and ‘K’ should not affect the behaviour of the target officer ‘T’. Accordingly, to 
construct our instruments we discard in the first part of our procedure any new peer of ‘T’ in 
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  − 1 that had at least one peer that worked along ‘T’ during quarters   − 3 to  . This strategy 
satisfies the exclusion restriction since only the peers of peers who had no evidence of direct 
contact with ‘T’ during the past year are used in the construction of the instruments. Note that 
‘I’, ‘J’ and ‘K’ satisfy this criterion.  
In the bottom panel of Figure 1, we consider the case in which ‘T’ experiences new 
peers but does not change line manager. Following the same procedure, we select ‘H’ and 
observe the behaviour of his peers in   − 2 and   − 3 to construct the instruments. In our 
examples, only ‘H’ was selected in the first step; however, when more than one peer in   − 1 
satisfy the criteria imposed, we compute for each of these peers the two measures of peers of 
peers conduct described (P1 and P2) and average these measures across them. Thus, we use 
 1      and  2     as instruments of         (   ).  
Observations that satisfy our criteria for identification are not prevalent in the data 
and, thus, our estimation of peer effects is restricted to a sample of 80,632 quarter 
observations (24% of the total quarter observations of the data) from 30,627 individuals. A 
summary of the average composition (by quarter) of the sample used is shown in 
Supplementary Table 2. The left column displays the average composition per quarter for the 
whole sample. The right column restricts the sample to those observations in which an 
individual faces a change of peers. Supplementary Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 
number of peers for each of these samples. There is not apparent evidence of a 
disproportionate selection of particular groups of individuals, which means our estimates of 
peer effects should generalise to the wider population of all officers and civilian staff.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
We have outlined above how the instrumental variable estimation approach is critical 
to addressing the three challenges for identification of the causal effect of peer misconduct. 
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To have an initial approximation of the direction and magnitude of peer effects on 
misconduct, in the Supplementary Information Section we present the estimates from linear 
probability panel data models—including both fixed and random effects—that cover all 
individuals in our data (see Supplementary Table 3). These panel models do not correct for 
endogeneity. While these panel models can be applied to the whole data set, they do not 
address the three challenges to estimating the casual effect. We find that the panel models 
show significant but small effects of peer misconduct. But our instrumental variable approach 
reveals that the panel models greatly underestimate the causal effect of peer misconduct.  
Table 2 presents the estimates using our instrumental variable approach. The first 
variable, the proportion of peers in   − 1 with misconduct, is instrumented using the 
proportion of peers of ‘H’ with misconduct from Figure 1 (i.e., using the proportion of ‘I’, 
‘J’, and ‘K’ with misconduct). In Model 1, we present the estimates from a two-step efficient 
GMM estimator (results from the first stage are presented in Supplementary Table 5). Due to 
the instrumenting of our endogenous variable, 75% of the observations are lost; however, as 
described earlier in Supplementary Table 2, the remaining sample is structurally similar to the 
whole sample. Since in this remaining sample more than half of the individuals (15,038 out 
of 30,627) have only 2 or 3 quarter observations, we are unable to apply panel data 
estimators. However, the SEs of our GMM estimates are robust to arbitrary within-individual 
correlations. The coefficient of 0.768 (t(30626)=4.91, p<0.001, 95% CI[0.461 - 1.075]) in 
Model 1 for the instrumented proportion of peers at   − 1 with misconduct means that a 10-
percentage point change in the proportion of peers with misconduct would cause an increase 
of 7.68 percentage points in the target misconduct.  
In Model 1, the estimates for the control variables are in line with the findings of 
other studies in the literature: male workers, police officers and less experienced employees 
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are prone to receive more allegations of misconduct. We also see expected signs for a 
positive effect of previous employee performance reviews. 
At the bottom of the Model-1 Column of Table 2, we test the validity of our 
instruments. To be valid, they should satisfy two requirements: they must be correlated with 
the endogenous variable         (   ) and orthogonal to the error process. At the bottom of 
Table 2, we report the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap   statistics for week identification that 
examines the joint significance of both instruments in determining the endogenous variable. 
With a value of 97.75, sufficiently larger than 10, the threshold suggested by Staiger and 
Stock38 to prevent biases by using weak instruments, the first-stage  -statistic confirms that 
our instruments are strong. We also report the Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic for under 
identification which is robust in the presence of heteroscedasticity and clustering in errors. 
Rejection of the null indicates that our model is identified—that is, that our instruments are 
relevant. To evaluate the validity of the instruments, we also report the  -statistic of Hansen39 
that tests the null hypothesis of orthogonality of the instruments and the error process which 
shows that our instruments are exogenous. 
In Model 2, we use an alternative estimator, an instrumental variable probit estimator, 
which also alleviates endogeneity concerns, but it is appropriate for binary dependent 
variables and continuous endogenous covariates. The resulting estimates provide further 
statistical support for the presence of peer effects. At the bottom of the column for Model 2, 
we also report the   statistics of the Wald test of endogeneity of the instrumented variable, 
which rejects the null hypothesis that         (   ) is exogenous.  
Coefficients from Model 2 do not represent marginal effects as coefficients from 
Model 1 do.  In order to ease the comparison of both models, Figure 2 illustrates the extent of 
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the peer effects from Model 2. Reassuringly, the peer effects are close in magnitude to those 
obtained by GMM in Model 1.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Under the concern that our estimation of peer effects might still reflect correlated 
effects due to unobservable events not accounted by our controls or endogeneity due to 
disregarded indirect interactions between individual   and the peers of peers used in the 
constructions of our instruments, we perform the following falsification test. Observe in the 
top panel of Figure 1 that the behaviours of individuals ‘I’, ‘J’ and ‘K’ are expected to 
influence the conduct of ‘T’ during quarter   through a single and unique channel, ‘H’. 
However, during quarter   former peers of ‘T’ (i.e., ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’) who remained under the 
direction of Line Manager 1 and, consequently, had no direct contact with ‘H’ should not be 
affected by any sort of misconduct of ‘I’, ‘J’ or ‘K’ that took place during quarter   − 2 or 
  − 3. Thus, our falsification test consists of replacing the dependent variable     by the 
proportion of former peers of   who receive allegations of misconduct during quarter  . These 
peers are those who worked along   during quarter   − 2 (the period immediately preceding 
the movement of   into a new peer group). The control variables are analogous to those used 
in Table 2. They include the proportion of male peers, the proportions of peers for each rank, 
business group and performance rating, the average length of service and the usual year and 
seasonal controls.  
Models 1-3 of Table 3 present the results of this falsification test. Models 1-3 are 
fitting the misconduct of former peers of the target, who should be unaffected by our 
instruments. The sample size for our falsification test is smaller because it is restricted to 
those quarter observations in which individuals change line managers (illustrated in the top 
PEER EFFECTS IN POLICE MISCONDUCT 15 
 
panel of Figure 1). Model 4 of Table 3 is fitting misconduct of the target, and here we should 
replicate our headline peer effect from Model 1 of Table 2, but on the smaller sample size.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The peer effects for Models 1-3 of Table 3 are much lower, imprecise, and not 
statistically different from zero, as we expected from the falsification test. Model 4 of Table 3 
produced estimates very like those found in Table 2 Model 1, replicating our headline peer 
effect within the smaller sample. The specification tests confirm the validity of the 
instruments in all models, as informed by the Hansen J-statistics and F-statistics, except for 
Model 3. Yet, any possible endogeneity problem that remains unsolved in Models 1-3 would 
induce some upward bias in the estimated peer effects these columns display. However, these 
peer effects are of small and non-significant size. Regarding the effect of the control 
variables, across the different specifications they exhibit the expected signs and comparable 
sizes. 
In the Supplementary Information, we do additional robustness checks. To further 
control for placement in high crime areas, we repeat our main analysis and add fixed effects 
for geographical locations at a higher level. In terms of geographic policing, we add 32 
dummy variables distinguishing 32 Borough Operational Command Units.  We also control 
for specific groups of Territorial Policing (TP): TP - Central, TP - Westminster, and 6 
subgroups that are part of the TP - Criminal Justice & Crime (Met Detention, Met 
Prosecutions, RTPC - Roads and Transport Policing Com, TP - Capability and Support, TP 
Crime Recording Investigation Bureau, and TP Crime Recording Investigation Bureau). The 
pattern of estimates is as before, the coefficients on the proportion of peers with misconduct 
are positive and indicate that an increase in 10-percentage points in the proportion of peers 
with misconduct raises the likelihood of misconduct by 7.31 percentage points (B=0.731, 
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t(30626)=4.29, p<0.001, 95% CI[0.397 - 1.066]) (Supplementary Table 7, Model 1). The 
coefficient estimates on the control variables are keeping with those reported in Table 2. 
We also evaluate whether our results vary after controlling for the supervisors’ 
performance. We repeat our analysis and include dummies for the performance scores of 
supervisors in the preceding year, quarter   − 4. These performance scores are reported on 
annual basis in Performance Development Reviews and evaluate competences in operational 
effectiveness, organizational influence, and resource management. Our estimates remain 
consistent after the addition of these controls. The results suggest a correlation between 
misconduct and supervisors’ performance such that individuals under the supervision of 
‘Competent Above Standard’ or ‘Exceptional’ supervisors have 3.9 percentage points less 
incidence of misconduct than individuals under the supervision of ‘Competent but with 
Development Required’ or ‘Not Yet Competent’ supervisors (B=-0.039, t(32182)=-1.75   
p=0.080, 95% CI[-0.083 - 0.005]), Supplementary Table 7, Model 3). Since supervisor 
effects are endogenous—individuals and their supervisors influence each other 
simultaneously—this association is merely correlational rather than causal. 
We also investigate whether our effects are consistent by analysing separately the 
sample of individuals who moved to a new different peer group (as described at the top of 
Figure 1) and the sample that remain in their current peer group but have new incoming peers 
(as described at the bottom of Figure 1), while retaining the complete set of exhaustive 
geographical controls. In Supplementary Table 9, peer effects in both samples are of 
comparable size and the analysis on each sample individually pass the diagnostic tests for 
both the relevance (LM test statistic for under identification - Kleibergen-Paap) and the 
validity (Hansen’s J test) of our instruments. 
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Finally, we studied whether peer effects interact with the peer group size. While 
controlling for the peer group size (Supplementary Table 11, Column 1) increases the point 
estimate of peer effects from 7.68 to 7.76 percentage points (point estimate at the median of 
the peer group size, 7 peers, following a 10% increase in prior peer misconduct, B=0.776, 
z=4.09, p<0.001, 95% CI[0.404 - 1.148]), both peer group size and its interaction with peers’ 
misconduct have negligible and non-significant effects on misconduct. 
Thus far, we have quantified sizable peer effects after analyzing peer groups 
dynamics. There remains the question of why officers and staff are moved from one group to 
another. In Supplementary Table 13, we study which factors correlate with transfers or line 
manager changes. While past misconduct and past performance appear to correlate with 
changes of line managers, this correlation is relatively small. On one hand, misconduct in the 
preceding semester increases the likelihood of switching line managers by only 4.6 
percentage points (B=0.046, z=11.85, p<0.001, 95% CI[0.038 - 0.053)], Model 1, 
Suppementary Table 11). On the other hand, employees with ‘Exceptional’ or ‘Competent 
Above Standard’ performance are 3.6 percentage points less likely to switch line managers in 
comparison with employees with poor performance (rated as ‘Not Yet Competent’ or 
‘Competent but Development Required’, B=-0.036, z=-2.85, p=0.004, 95% CI[-0.062 - -
0.011], Model 2, Suppementary Table 13). Rather than past behavior, switching peer groups 
appear to be driven more by demographic characteristics. Inspectors and police sergeants, 
workers with few years of experience, and workers placed in particular geographic locations 
have a higher likelihood of moving peer groups, Model 3, Supplementary Table 13. 
Before turning to the main conclusions of the study, we must highlight a few caveats. 
Obviously, the major constraint of our study is the assumption that complaints filed against 
officers are accurate proxies of misconduct events. Yet, these complaints could either over or 
under represent real misconduct cases. For example, fellow officers, as opposed to citizens, 
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fail to report misconduct due to their cultural rules of integrity. Informally, the “Code” 
discourages them from reporting misconduct of their peers20,40. On the other hand, citizen 
allegations of misconduct may be discouraged when there is fear of retaliation or a low 
confidence in the complaint process41. Our data, however, do not allow us to distinguish the 
source of the complaints. Moreover, most of the allegations reported were unsubstantiated 
because of the relative lack of physical evidence and the absence of witnesses, which makes 
the cases difficult to probe. However, the absence of evidence does not necessarily imply the 
absence of police misconduct. In research of this nature, we are limited to the analysis of 
reported cases of misconduct taking them as factual. We note, however, that the study of 
allegations of misconduct is the usual approach adopted by the related literature and so no 
study in this domain has been immune to this constraint. 
There is also concern about whether the frequency of complaints mirrors officers’ 
productivity. There is evidence suggesting that more proactive officers, officers placed in 
areas with high crime rates, and officers that due to their patrol assignment are more likely to 
be in contact with citizens, are prone to receive citizen’s allegations of misconduct14,41. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to control for the officers’ arrest activity. However, to the 
extent that some degree of arrest activity might be associated to characteristics that might 
have remained relatively stable over the four-year interval of available data, such as rank 
hierarchy or the assignment to different police units, we do capture the effects of individual 
productivity. 
In conclusion, we demonstrate that deviant behaviour can be spread through 
socialization: a 10-percentage points increase in the fraction of peers with misconduct would 
raise the incidence of misconduct by an absolute 8%. These results are consistent when an 
officer switches to an entirely new group or when he receives new members to his current 
peer group. Perhaps officers’ beliefs about what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour 
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become more permissive when officers become part of closely connected groups with deviant 
behaviour. Following, Ashforth and Anand42, because life is lived in concrete settings, 
localized social cultures tend to be highly salient, and the individual’s commitment to ethics 
may relax under the press of local circumstances. By process of socialization, officers may 
learn to accept unethical practices. Moreover, local groups often provide accounts to 
rationalize or neutralize the guilt that individuals engaging in misconduct might otherwise 
feel, such as denial of the victim, denial of injury, denial of responsibility, and refocusing 
attention, among other accounts.  
We should note that our results do not imply (or deny) the possibility that these 
effects occurred because officers learned from each other which behaviour is best to follow to 
satisfy their own interests or, instead perhaps, because they were corrupted by the pure peer 
pressure of their colleagues. Nor can we engage in the discussion about which mechanisms 
have driven these peer influences. Nevertheless, it is quite reasonable to speculate that a large 
portion of these effects reveal evidence of social conformity. Notice that extensive qualitative 
research highlights that police culture is typically imbedded in unwritten rules and protected 
by a code of silence and extreme group loyalty43. Recent findings provided by Hough et al.44, 
after examining cases of alleged misconduct involving chief police officers in England and 
Wales over a six-year period, up to 2013, suggest that, throughout their careers, police 
officers felt under pressure to not step outside the norm. The ethical climate, promoted by a 
typical command-and-control style of management, is alleged to lack ethical values or, even 
worse, to sustain the wrong kinds of values. The command-and-control style of management 
appears to encourage close mutually supportive and inward-looking networks that favor 
homogeneity, preclude difference and even accept or tolerate bullying behavior. Hough et 
al’s findings suggest that officers involved in misconduct are part of groups in which there is 
little to no stigma associated with misconduct. 
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Our peer effect results are to some extent consistent with the work of Chappell and 
Piquero31, Getty, Worrall and Morris32, and Ingram, Paoline and Terrill30, who suggested that 
peer effects are important determinants of misconduct based on correlational studies, and 
lend also support to differential association theory, according to which criminal behaviour 
can be learnt through long, frequent and intense interactions with individuals holding 
attitudes that encourage criminal activity45. 
Beyond quantifying the magnitude of peer effects, our research has important policy 
implications. We have provided robust evidence that misconduct spreads between peers. It is 
unlikely that officers will have incentives to attempt to eliminate misconduct if there is no 
stigma associated with misconduct among their peers. Our results suggest that moving a bad 
cop to alternative locations will increase the risk of spreading misconduct. Thus, deterrence 
of police misconduct requires additional actions beyond the mere transfer of officers to other 
units. Studying which policy actions (ethical training, clear ethical standards, stronger 
sanctions, etc.) are more effective in preventing or discouraging misconduct represents an 
important arena for future research. 
In addition to identifying sizable peer effects, we also replicate the individual 
differences that are associated with misconduct. In consistency with earlier research, we 
found that certain demographic characteristics are consistently present in individuals with 
higher risk of misconduct, such as few years of experience, poor ratings of past performance, 
male gender, or certain employee types (like police sergeant and constable). 
Although it seems intuitive that individuals’ experience and the social context in 
which they operate can influence their behaviour, our research provides compelling evidence 
for this intuition in police misconduct research. 
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Methods  
Data Sources 
Our study uses four databases maintained by the Metropolitan Police Service. The first 
dataset contains demographic information for 13,558 civilian staff and 35,845 police officers 
in active service at the end of the first quarter of 2015. This information includes gender, 
employee types and roles, length of service and business groups. The Met comprises four 
business groups: Specialist Operations, Met Operations (or Specialist Crime & Operations), 
Professionalism, and Frontline or Territorial Policing. Territorial Policing data is divided into 
32 Borough Operational Command Units. These business groups are supported by civilian 
staffed support departments, which provide personnel, finance and legal services.  
The second dataset includes daily records of allegations of misconduct filed against 
civilian staff and police officers from the second quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2015. 
Each record contains fields for the date of the incident, the nature of the allegations and the 
complaint’s final disposition (if any). Allegations include citizen complaints and internal 
complaints filed by supervisors or other officers, however the records do not distinguish 
between these two sources. The third dataset comprises the individuals’ performance scores 
reported on annual basis in Performance Development Reviews from 2011 to 2014. Scores 
are given on specific categories: operational effectiveness, organizational influence, resource 
management, and final overall rating of performance. Final scores position individuals as 
‘Not Yet Competent’, ‘Competent but Development Required’, ‘Competent at Required 
Standard’, ‘Competent Above Standard’ and ‘Exceptional’. The fourth dataset contains 
semestral records of employees and their line managers from 2011 to 2015. 
The final panel of data, obtained by merging these data sources, has repeated 
quarterly observations nested within each of the individuals. It comprises 35,924 people 
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(31.7% were civil staff; 64.7%, males; and 13.6%, from black and minority ethnic groups) for 
the period 2011 to 2014. In this final panel of data, we were able to identify the work groups 
of individuals by linking officers assigned to the same supervisor in a given quarter. The 
median team size is eight. 
Supervisors are in charge of familiarizing their team about their roles, responsibilities 
and local policing aims. Supervisors are also in charge of addressing underperformance 
among their team. Team members are socially more cohesive and evaluated under alike 
ethical standards. Our study evaluates the effects of peers’ misconduct under this definition of 
peer groups.  
Statistical methods 
We use instrumental variable techniques and test peer effects in a linear probability 
model using two-step GMM estimators.  Our identification strategy exploits the variation in 
peers that is experienced by officers who switch peer groups. Figure 1 illustrates the 
procedure followed for the construction of our instruments.  
Code availability 
Analyses were conducted in R 3.4.5 and Stata 13.1. All code is available in the public 
repository https://github.com/edikaQT/misconduct_peer_effects. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. The identification strategy for peer effects. Each column represents the peer groups 
under the direction of three different line managers over time. ‘T’ is the target individual 
under study. The double line frames highlight the groups that ‘T’ belongs to at each time. In 
time   − 1, ‘T’ experiences a different peer group, either because he switches line manager 
(top panel) or because new workers are assigned to his group (bottom panel). In both cases, 
the behaviour of ‘I’, ‘J’, and ‘K’, who are the peers of worker ‘H’ in   − 2 and   − 3, are 
used as instruments of the peers of ‘T’ in   − 1. Observe that ‘I’, ‘J’ and ‘K’ had no direct 
contact with ‘T’ during the past year (i.e.,   − 3 to  ) and so this strategy satisfies the 
exclusion restriction required for identification. 
 
Figure 2. Fitted probability of misconduct at   conditional on the proportion of peers 
exhibiting events of misconduct in   − 1. Peer effects are based on estimates of Model 2, 
IVPROBIT, of Table 2 (N=80,612 observations). Estimates are at the mean base levels of 
covariates. The shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals. 
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Tables 
Table 1. The Distribution of Allegations Against Civil Staff and Police Officers by Disciplinary Outcome 
 Action Type 
  Civilian Staff  Police 
Allegation Type No Action Management Action 
Formal 
Action UPP 
Retired / 
Resigned Total 
 No 
Action 
Management 
Action 
Formal 
Action UPP 
Retired / 
Resigned Total 
              
Failures in duty 1,020 479 444 2 0 1,945  22,628 2,849 633 59 0 26,169 52.44% 24.63% 22.83% 0.10% 0.00%   86.47% 10.89% 2.42% 0.23% 0.00%  
              
Malpractice 59 19 64 0 0 142  2,610 246 73 4 0 2,933 41.55% 13.38% 45.07% 0.00% 0.00%   88.99% 8.39% 2.49% 0.14% 0.00%  
              
Discriminatory 
behaviour 
108 35 10 0 0 153  2,938 210 48 4 0 3,200 
70.59% 22.88% 6.54% 0.00% 0.00%   91.81% 6.56% 1.50% 0.13% 0.00%  
              
Oppressive 
behaviour 
35 7 2 0 0 44  2,962 231 24 5 0 3,222 
79.55% 15.91% 4.55% 0.00% 0.00%   91.93% 7.17% 0.74% 0.16% 0.00%  
              
Incivility 
394 408 63 1 0 866  4,955 764 105 4 1 5,829 
45.50% 47.11% 7.27% 0.12% 0.00%   85.01% 13.11% 1.80% 0.07% 0.02%  
              
Other 94 48 162 0 0 304  815 166 75 0 0 1,056 30.92% 15.79% 53.29% 0.00% 0.00%   77.18% 15.72% 7.10% 0.00% 0.00%  
              
Total 1,710 996 745 3 0 3,454  36,908 4,466 958 76 1 42,409 49.51% 28.84% 21.57% 0.09% 0.00%   87.03% 10.53% 2.26% 0.18% 0.00%  
Note. Allegations recorder against 1,994 civil Staff and 12,921 police officer over the period 2011 to 2014. UPP refers to ‘Unsatisfactory Performance Procedure’. Other 
allegations include traffic allegations. Most formal actions (88.90%) were taken based on substantiated allegations, while only 3.35% management actions and 0.05% no 
actions were linked to substantiated allegations. 
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Table 2. Peer Effects on the Likelihood of Misconduct 
 
 Individuals experiencing new peers 
  
 (1) (2)   
VARIABLES GMM IV PROBIT   
Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct 0.768*** 5.426***   
 [0.461 - 1.075] [4.048 - 6.803]   
Gender (reference: Females)     
 Male 0.017*** 0.140***   
 [0.013 - 0.020] [0.102 - 0.178]   
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)     
 Police Constable 0.017*** 0.210***   
 [0.009 - 0.025] [0.128 - 0.291]   
 Police Sergeant 0.022*** 0.270***   
 [0.013 - 0.031] [0.178 - 0.361]   
 Inspector 0.019*** 0.254***   
 [0.008 - 0.031] [0.145 - 0.364]   
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 
0.016* 0.143   
 [0.004 - 0.028] [-0.036 - 0.323]   
Business Group 
(reference: Territorial Police (TP) - Boroughs 
East) 
    
 TP - Boroughs North -0.001 -0.005   
 [-0.010 - 0.008] [-0.057 - 0.047]   
 TP - Boroughs South 0.007 0.038   
 [-0.001 - 0.015] [-0.009 - 0.085]   
 TP - Boroughs West 0.002 0.013   
 [-0.007 - 0.010] [-0.037 - 0.064]   
 TP - Central -0.033**    
 [-0.056 - -0.010]    
 TP - Criminal Justice & Crime 0.006 0.066*   
 [-0.003 - 0.015] [0.010 - 0.121]   
 TP - Westminster 0.006 0.034   
 [-0.007 - 0.018] [-0.039 - 0.108]   
 Specialist Crime and Operations -0.006 -0.053   
 [-0.016 - 0.004] [-0.127 - 0.022]   
 Specialist Operations -0.013~ -0.163**   
 [-0.027 - 0.001] [-0.281 - -0.045]   
 Other Business Group -0.001 -0.204**   
 [-0.015 - 0.014] [-0.354 - -0.055]   
Length of service     
 Length of service (10 years) -0.013* -0.057   
 [-0.025 - -0.001] [-0.152 - 0.038]   
 Length of service (10 years)2  0.002 -0.003   
 [-0.001 - 0.005] [-0.029 - 0.023]   
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4  
 (reference: Competent but development required 
+ Not Yet Competent)  
    
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.038** -0.285***   
 [-0.062 - -0.015] [-0.428 - -0.142]   
  Competent (at required standard) -0.035** -0.256***   
 [-0.059 - -0.012] [-0.392 - -0.120]   
     
Constant 0.038* -1.606***   
 [0.002 - 0.074] [-1.753 - -1.459]   
     
Observations 80,632 80,612   
Number of individuals 30,627 30,617   
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 Individuals experiencing new peers 
  
 (1) (2)   
VARIABLES GMM IV PROBIT   
LM test statistic for under identification 
(Kleibergen-Paap)  
199.3    
P-value of under identification LM statistic <0.001    
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-
Paap) 
97.75    
Hansen Statistic 0.520    
Degrees freedom of Hansen Statistic 1    
P-value Hansen Statistic 0.471    
Wald test of endogeneity,   (1)  29.97   
Exogeneity test Wald p-value  <0.001   
Quarter FEs YES YES   
Year FEs YES YES   
Note. All models estimate the probability of an event of misconduct in quarter   conditional on a set of 
covariates. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when at least one event of misconduct is reported in 
quarter  . The independent variable of interest is the proportion of peers in quarter   − 1 with reported cases of 
misconduct. Our identification strategy exploits the variation in peer groups experienced by the individuals 
during the period 2011-2014. We use instrumental variable techniques for the identification of peer effects. 
Column 1 presents a 2-step GMM linear model and Column 2, an IV PROBIT model. Two instruments are used 
for identification: the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in   − 2 and, likewise, 
the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in   − 3. The models include dummy 
controls to account for seasonal variation in the report of misconduct events: Quarter FE and year FE correspond 
to quarter dummies and year dummies. The first stage results of Column 1 are displayed in Supplementary 
Table 5. 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. Significance levels: 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10. 
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Table 3. Estimated Likelihood of Misconduct, Peer Effects: Falsification Test 
 DV:  Prop. of former peers in   − 2 with cases of misconduct in     DV: Misconduct in   
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) 
VARIABLES GMM GMM GMM  VARIABLES GMM 
       
 Prop. of peers in   −1 with 
misconduct 
0.162 0.156 0.132  Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct 0.802* 
 [-0.105 - 0.428] [-0.144 - 0.456] [-0.171 - 0.436]   [0.124 - 1.480] 
       
Gender (reference:  Prop. of 
Females) 
    Gender (reference: Females) 0.014** 
  Prop. of Males 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***  Male [0.005 - 0.022] 
 [0.011 - 0.024] [0.011 - 0.026] [0.010 - 0.025]    
Employee type (reference:  Prop. of 
Civil Staff) 
    Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)  
  Prop. of Police Constable 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.030***  Police Constable 0.015~ 
 [0.019 - 0.036] [0.018 - 0.039] [0.019 - 0.040]   [-0.001 - 0.031] 
  Prop. of Police Sergeant 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.034***  Police Sergeant 0.026*** 
 [0.018 - 0.036] [0.020 - 0.042] [0.022 - 0.045]   [0.012 - 0.041] 
  Prop. of Inspector 0.015** 0.021** 0.025***  Inspector 0.019* 
 [0.004 - 0.026] [0.007 - 0.034] [0.011 - 0.038]   [0.001 - 0.038] 
  Prop. of Chief Inspector, 
Superintendent,  
  Chief Superintendent 
0.025** 0.022* 0.026*  Chief Inspector, Superintendent, 
Chief Superintendent 
0.017~ 
 [0.008 - 0.042] [0.002 - 0.042] [0.006 - 0.046]   [-0.003 - 0.036] 
  Prop. of Special Constabulary -0.049*** -0.068*** -0.067***  Special Constabulary - 
 [-0.061 - -0.037] [-0.094 - -0.042] [-0.092 - -0.042]    
Business Group 
(reference:  Prop. in TP - Boroughs 
East) 
    Business Group 
(reference: TP - Boroughs East) 
 
  Prop. in TP - Boroughs North -0.004 -0.009* -0.009~  TP - Boroughs North -0.001 
 [-0.011 - 0.004] [-0.018 - -0.000] [-0.018 - 0.000]   [-0.018 - 0.015] 
  Prop. in TP - Boroughs South 0.006~ 0.005 0.005  TP - Boroughs South 0.001 
 [-0.001 - 0.013] [-0.003 - 0.013] [-0.003 - 0.014]   [-0.014 - 0.016] 
  Prop. in TP - Boroughs West -0.006 -0.007 -0.007  TP - Boroughs West 0.001 
 [-0.013 - 0.001] [-0.016 - 0.003] [-0.016 - 0.002]   [-0.015 - 0.017] 
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 DV:  Prop. of former peers in   − 2 with cases of misconduct in     DV: Misconduct in   
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) 
VARIABLES GMM GMM GMM  VARIABLES GMM 
  Prop. in TP - Central -0.011 -0.026 -0.022  TP - Central -0.029* 
 [-0.048 - 0.026] [-0.078 - 0.027] [-0.075 - 0.032]   [-0.054 - -0.004] 
  Prop. in TP - Criminal Justice & 
Crime 
-0.006 -0.009~ -0.009~  TP - Criminal Justice & Crime 0.011 
 [-0.015 - 0.004] [-0.019 - 0.001] [-0.019 - 0.001]   [-0.008 - 0.029] 
  Prop. in TP - Westminster 0.007 0.007 0.007  TP - Westminster 0.020 
 [-0.005 - 0.019] [-0.008 - 0.021] [-0.007 - 0.021]   [-0.005 - 0.045] 
  Prop. in Specialist Crime and 
Operations 
-0.028*** -0.030*** -0.029***  Specialist Crime and Operations -0.002 
 [-0.037 - -0.019] [-0.040 - -0.020] [-0.039 - -0.019]   [-0.022 - 0.018] 
  Prop. in Specialist Operations -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.048***  Specialist Operations -0.005 
 [-0.060 - -0.034] [-0.064 - -0.034] [-0.063 - -0.033]   [-0.034 - 0.024] 
  Prop. in Other Business Group -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.035***  Other Business Group 0.001 
 [-0.047 - -0.022] [-0.051 - -0.023] [-0.049 - -0.022]   [-0.028 - 0.031] 
Length of service     Length of service  
 Average Length of service (10 
years) 
-0.026*** -0.034*** -0.039***  Length of service (10 years) -0.022* 
 [-0.038 - -0.015] [-0.048 - -0.020] [-0.053 - -0.025]   [-0.042 - -0.002] 
 Average Length of service (10 
years)^2  
0.003~ 0.006** 0.007**  Length of service (10 years)^2 0.004 
 [-0.000 - 0.007] [0.001 - 0.010] [0.002 - 0.011]   [-0.001 - 0.010] 
       
Employee Performance Rating 
in   − 4  (reference: Competent but 
development required + Not Yet 
Competent)  
    Employee Performance Rating in   − 4 
(reference: Competent but development required 
+ Not Yet Competent) 
 
  Prop. of Exceptional + Competent 
(above standard) 
 -0.079*** -0.080***  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.048* 
  [-0.125 - -0.034] [-0.125 - -0.035]   [-0.089 - -0.006] 
  Prop. of Competent (at required 
standard) 
 -0.072** -0.071**  Competent (at required standard) -0.041~ 
  [-0.117 - -0.026] [-0.116 - -0.025]   [-0.083 - 0.000] 
       
       
Constant 0.057*** 0.136*** 0.146***  Constant 0.054 
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 DV:  Prop. of former peers in   − 2 with cases of misconduct in     DV: Misconduct in   
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) 
VARIABLES GMM GMM GMM  VARIABLES GMM 
 [0.037 - 0.076] [0.088 - 0.184] [0.098 - 0.194]   [-0.011 - 0.118] 
       
Observations 27,040 19,796 19,796  Observations 20,374 
Number of individuals 18,506 14,111 14,111  Number of individuals 14,401 
       
LM test statistic for 
underidentification (Kleibergen-
Paap) 
52.51 40.70 39.53  LM test statistic for under identification 
(Kleibergen-Paap) 
35.16 
P-value of under identification LM 
statistic 
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001  P-value of under identification LM statistic <0.001 
F statistic for weak identification 
(Kleibergen-Paap) 
25.39 19.62 19.09  F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-
Paap) 
16.98 
       
       
Hansen Statistic 3.135 3.486 3.889  Hansen Statistic 0.0304 
Degrees freedom of Hansen Statistic 1 1 1  Degrees freedom of Hansen Statistic 1 
P-value Hansen Statistic 0.077 0.062 0.049  P-value Hansen Statistic 0.862 
Quarter FEs NO NO YES  Quarter FEs YES 
Year FEs NO NO YES  Year FEs YES 
Note. All models apply instrumental variable techniques for the identification of peer effects. Models 1 to 3 are part of a falsification test that study the behaviour of former 
peers of an individual   who moves to a different peer group in   − 1. The outcome constitutes the proportion of these peers who had reports of misconduct at time  . The 
independent variable of interest is the proportion of peers of   in   − 1 presenting incidence of misconduct. This variable is instrumented by two measures of conduct of peers 
of peers of  . By construction, these two measures are expected to have no influence on the outcome variable of these models. Model 4 is presented for comparative purposes 
and uses the standard outcome variable of the study, misconduct of   at time  . 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05, ~ p<0.10. 
 
 
 Line Manager 1  Line Manager 2  Line Manager 3  Instruments 
        
  − 3 T, A, B, C  D, E, F, G  H, I, J, K  P2 = Proportion of H's peers with misconduct in   − 3 
         
  − 2 T, A, B, C  D, E, F, G  H, I, J, K  P1 = Proportion of H's peers with misconduct in   − 2 
        
  − 1 A, B, C, L  T, D, E, F, G, H  I, J, K, M     
        
  A, B, C, L  T, D, E, F, G, H  I, J, K, M     
        
 
 Line Manager 1  Line Manager 2  Line Manager 3  Instruments 
        
  − 3 T, A, B, C  D, E, F, G  H, I, J, K  P2 = Proportion of H's peers with misconduct in   − 3 
         
  − 2 T, A, B, C  D, E, F, G  H, I, J, K  P1 = Proportion of H's peers with misconduct in   − 2 
        
  − 1 T, A, B, C, H  D, E, F, G  I, J, K, M     
        
  T, A, B, C, H  D, E, F, G  I, J, K, M     
        
Figure 1. The identification strategy for peer effects. Each column represents the peer groups 
under the direction of three different line managers over time. ‘T’ is the target individual 
under study. The double line frames highlight the groups that ‘T’ belongs to at each time. In 
time   − 1, ‘T’ experiences a different peer group, either because he switches line manager 
(top panel) or because new workers are assigned to his group (bottom panel). In both cases, 
the behaviour of ‘I’, ‘J’, and ‘K’, who are the peers of worker ‘H’ in   − 2 and   − 3, are 
used as instruments of the peers of ‘T’ in   − 1. Observe that ‘I’, ‘J’ and ‘K’ had no direct 
contact with ‘T’ during the past year (i.e.,   − 3 to  ) and so this strategy satisfies the 
exclusion restriction required for identification. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Fitted probability of misconduct at   conditional on the proportion of peers 
exhibiting events of misconduct in   − 1. Peer effects are based on estimates of Model 2, 
IVPROBIT, of Table 2. Estimates are at the mean base levels of covariates. The shaded area 
represents 95% confidence intervals. 
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Fixed Effects and Random Effects Estimates 
Supplementary Table 3 presents results from panel models including both fixed and random 
effects that do not use instrumental variables. These panel models fit Equation 1 using all 
quarters in the data, even those in which peers never switch peer groups. While these panel 
models can be applied to the whole data set, they do not correct for endogeneity. 
We find that the panel models show significant but small effects of peer misconduct. 
But our instrumental variable approach reveals that the panel models greatly underestimate 
the causal effect of peer misconduct.  
Model 1 of Supplementary Table 3 shows the random effects (RE) estimates of 
Equation 1. We observe positive and statistically significant peer effects. Model 2 displays 
fixed effects (FE) estimates that account for any unobserved time invariant characteristic of 
the individuals. Although FE estimates are smaller in magnitude, they still exhibit the 
expected positive sign. Models 3 and 4 employ similar estimators but are restricted to the 
sample of individuals who had at least one incidence of misconduct in the period 2011 to 
2014. There is no apparent variation in the size of the peer effects in this subset of the data. 
These preliminary results indicate that a 10-percentage point increase in the proportion of 
peers with cases of misconduct in   − 1 would rise the rate of misconduct in   by between 
0.17 (t(359233)=3.48, p=0.001, CI[0.007 - 0.026], Model 2) to 0.66  percentage points 
(z=14.60, p< 0.001, CI[0.057 - 0.075], Model 1). Although these results suggest that peer 
misconduct has some small negative spillover effects, part of these effects are potentially 
spurious because we have not yet accounted for endogeneity in the estimates. 
Table 2 in the main text presents the estimates using our instrumental variables 
approach, which is critical for identifying the causal effect of peer misconduct. We observe 
that the estimated coefficients of peer effects in Table 2 are much larger to those found in the 
panel models from Supplementary Table 3. A possible explanation for the large difference in 
the GMM estimates from Table 2 and the RE and FE estimates from Supplementary Table 3 
is measurement errors in the endogenous variable         (   ), which will lead to 
attenuation bias in the RE and FE estimates1. Note that our endogenous variable represents 
the proportion of peers in   − 1 with cases of misconduct and so measurement errors could 
arise if this proportion does not always capture all peers in   − 1, probably because peers 
formally registered under certain line manager are only a subset of the actual peer group. 
Hence, RE and FE estimates are subject to two sources of bias operating in opposite 
directions: the upward bias caused by both endogeneity and correlated effects and the 
downward bias caused by measurement errors. If the endogenous variable is measured with 
error, our instruments are also subject to measurement error, as they represent the proportion 
of peers of peers with cases of misconduct. However, to the extent that the measurement 
errors in our instruments are uncorrelated with the measurement errors in the endogenous 
variable, our GMM estimator should correct both the endogeneity bias and the attenuation 
bias. Also, note that in contrast to the endogenous variable that measures the proportion of 
peers with misconduct of a single individual, our instruments,  1      and  2    , constitute 
averages across many individuals and therefore should be subject to smaller measurement 
errors.  
  
Supplementary Figures 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. The distribution of individuals according to the number and type of 
misconduct received over the period 2011Q1-2014Q4. Other allegations include traffic 
allegations. The cohort included 14,915 people. Within each panel, N displays the number of 
individuals with allegations of misconduct. The y-axis shows the percentage of N people with 
records of misconduct. The x-axis shows the number of cases of misconduct received during 
the period 2011Q1-2014Q4. The first bar refers to the percentage of N people with only one 
case of misconduct; whereas the last bar, with eleven cases of misconduct. Within each panel, 
bars add to 100%. 
  
N = 12,442 N = 2,864 N = 2,956
N = 2,859 N = 4,997 N = 1,295
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Failures in Duty Malpractice Discriminatory Behaviour
Opressive Behaviour Incivility Other Allegations
Number of Cases of Misconduct
a. Whole sample 
 
b. Individuals who experience new peers 
 
Supplementary Figure 2. Distribution of number of peers by sample. The top panel includes 
all individual × quarter observation in the data (35,777 individuals and 311,652 
observations). The target individual is excluded from this count. Thus, the group size is 
equivalent to the number of peers plus one. The bottom panels restrict the data to those 
individual × quarter observations that satisfy our criteria for identification (30,047 individuals 
and 76,423 observations). Outliers below the 5-percentile and above the 95-percentile are 
excluded.
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Supplementary Tables 
Supplementary Table 1. Correlation of Allegations Within Individuals 
  Failures in duty Malpractice Discriminatory behaviour 
Oppressive 
behaviour Incivility 
Malpractice 0.171*** 1       
 (<0.001)         
 [0.156 - 0.187]         
            
Discriminatory 
behaviour 0.263
*** 0.083*** 1     
  (<0.001)  (<0.001)       
  [0.248 - 0.278] [0.067 - 0.099]       
           
Oppressive  
behaviour 0.271
*** 0.132*** 0.155*** 1   
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001)     
  [0.256 - 0.286] [0.116 - 0.148] [0.139 - 0.171]     
            
Incivility 0.271*** 0.050*** 0.214*** 0.115*** 1 
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)   
  [0.256 - 0.286] [0.034 - 0.066] [0.199 - 0.230] [0.099 - 0.131]   
            
Other 0.049*** 0.020* 0.030*** 0.020* 0.063*** 
  (<0.001) (0.016) (<0.001) (0.013) (<0.001) 
  [0.033 - 0.065] [0.004 - 0.036] [0.199 - 0.230] [0.004 - 0.036] [0.047 - 0.079] 
Note. Pearson correlations of allegation types within individuals. Other allegations include traffic allegations. 
The sample includes 14,915 individuals. 95% CI in brackets and p-values in parentheses, Significance levels: 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
 
 
  
Supplementary Table 2. Composition of the Data Used to Estimate Peer Effects 
 Whole sample  
Individuals who 
experience new peers 
Gender    
  Male 0.65  0.68 
    
Employee type    
 Police Constable 0.54  0.61 
 Police Sergeant 0.12  0.13 
 Inspector 0.03  0.03 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent, Chief Superintendent 0.01  0.01 
 Special Constabulary 0.00  0.00 
 Civil Staff 0.30  0.22 
    
Business Group    
 TP - Boroughs North 0.07  0.08 
 TP - Boroughs South 0.10  0.12 
 TP - Boroughs West 0.08  0.10 
 TP - Central 0.00  0.00 
 TP - Criminal Justice & Crime 0.12  0.11 
 TP - Westminster 0.03  0.03 
 Specialist Crime and Operations 0.27  0.26 
 Specialist Operations 0.12  0.11 
 Other Business Group 0.10  0.05 
    
Length of service (years) 13.45  12.77 
    
Employee Performance Rating    
 Exceptional + Competent (above standard) 0.49  0.49 
 Competent (at required standard) 0.50  0.51 
 Competent (development required) + Not Yet Competent 0.01  0.01 
    
Events of misconduct    
 Incidence of misconduct 0.05  0.06 
 Incidence of failures in duty 0.04  0.04 
 Incidence of malpractice 0.01  0.01 
 Incidence of discriminatory behavior 0.01  0.01 
 Incidence of oppressive behavior 0.01  0.01 
 Incidence of incivility 0.01  0.01 
 Occurrence of Formal disciplinary actions following misconduct 0.00  0.00 
 Occurrence of Management disciplinary actions following misconduct 0.01  0.01 
 Occurrence of No disciplinary actions following misconduct 0.04  0.04 
    
Total number of individual × quarter observations 331,023  80,632 
Note. The table displays the composition of the whole data (left column) and the subset used to estimate peer 
effects via instrumental variable regressions (right column). Cells show the proportions for each category of the 
total individual × quarter observations.  
Supplementary Table 3. The Estimated Likelihood of Misconduct, Peer Effects, Random and Fixed Effects Models 
 Whole sample   Individuals with incidence of misconduct 
 (1)    (2)     (3)    (4)   
VARIABLES RE p 95% CI  FE p 95% CI   RE p 95% CI  FE p 95% CI 
                 
Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct 0.066*** <0.001 [0.057 - 0.075]  0.017*** 0.001 [0.007 - 0.026]   0.063*** <0.001 [0.049 - 0.078]  0.028*** 0.001 [0.012 - 0.044] 
Gender (reference: Females)                 
 Male 0.015*** <0.001 [0.014 - 0.017]       0.014*** <0.001 [0.011 - 0.018]     
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)                 
 Police Constable 0.032*** <0.001 [0.030 - 0.034]       0.011*** <0.001 [0.007 - 0.015]     
 Police Sergeant 0.033*** <0.001 [0.029 - 0.036]       0.012*** <0.001 [0.006 - 0.018]     
 Inspector 0.025*** <0.001 [0.020 - 0.030]       0.001 0.809 [-0.009 - 0.011]     
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 0.010*** <0.001 [0.005 - 0.016]       -0.017* 0.025 [-0.032 - -0.002]     
Business Group 
(reference: TP - Boroughs East)                 
 TP - Boroughs North -0.000 0.955 [-0.005 - 0.005]       -0.000 0.896 [-0.007 - 0.006]     
 TP - Boroughs South 0.007** 0.003 [0.002 - 0.012]       0.008* 0.010 [0.002 - 0.014]     
 TP - Boroughs West 0.001 0.708 [-0.004 - 0.006]       0.003 0.374 [-0.004 - 0.009]     
 TP - Central -0.040*** <0.001 [-0.052 - -0.027]       -0.058* 0.046 [-0.116 - -0.001]     
 TP - Criminal Justice & Crime -0.010*** <0.001 [-0.014 - -0.005]       -0.005 0.116 [-0.011 - 0.001]     
 TP - Westminster -0.001 0.862 [-0.008 - 0.007]       -0.003 0.556 [-0.012 - 0.007]     
 Specialist Crime and Operations -0.029*** <0.001 [-0.032 - -0.025]       -0.020*** <0.001 [-0.025 - -0.015]     
 Specialist Operations -0.045*** <0.001 [-0.048 - -0.041]       -0.032*** <0.001 [-0.039 - -0.026]     
 Other Business Group -0.036*** <0.001 [-0.040 - -0.032]       -0.026*** <0.001 [-0.035 - -0.017]     
Length of service                 
 Length of service (10 years) -0.026*** <0.001 [-0.031 - -0.022]  -0.278*** <0.001 [-0.363 - -0.193]   -0.018*** <0.001 [-0.027 - -0.008]  -0.657*** <0.001 [-0.855 - -0.459] 
 Length of service (10 years)2 0.004*** <0.001 [0.003 - 0.006]  0.009*** 0.001 [0.004 - 0.015]   0.004** 0.004 [0.001 - 0.007]  0.027*** 0.001 [0.011 - 0.043] 
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required +  
Not Yet Competent)  
                
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.035*** <0.001 [-0.045 - -0.025]  -0.010 0.138 [-0.023 - 0.003]   -0.035*** <0.001 [-0.053 - -0.018]  -0.019 0.146 [-0.044 - 0.007] 
  Competent (at required standard) -0.028*** <0.001 [-0.039 - -0.018]  -0.010 0.150 [-0.023 - 0.003]   -0.030*** 0.001 [-0.047 - -0.012]  -0.018 0.160 [-0.042 - 0.007] 
                 
Constant 0.078*** <0.001 [0.066 - 0.090]  0.451*** <0.001 [0.322 - 0.580]   0.119*** <0.001 [0.099 - 0.140]  0.944*** <0.001 [0.678 - 1.210] 
                 
Observations 331,023    331,022     141,074    141,073   
Number of individuals 35,924    35,923     14,853    14,852   
ICC 0.0235         0       
   0.0329         0       
Quarter FEs YES    YES     YES    YES   
Year FEs YES    YES     YES    YES   
Note. All models estimate the probability of at least one event of misconduct in quarter    conditional on a set of covariates. The variable of interest is the proportion of peers in quarter   − 1 with reported cases of misconduct. Models 1 to 4 are 
linear probability panel data models that ignore the endogeneity in the peer misconduct measure. RE estimators in Models 1 and 3 incorporate random individual intercepts that are assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. RE 
estimators use information from both between individual variation and within individual variation in the data. However, FE estimators in Models 2 and 4 use only within individual variation in the data. Thus, time-invariant characteristics in our 
data, like gender, employee type or business groups, cannot be estimated by FE models. By using only within individual variation, FE estimators allow for correlations between the individual intercepts and the explanatory variables. Alternative 
specifications applying instrumental variable techniques for the identification of peer effects are presented in Table 2 in the main text. 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10. 
Supplementary Table 4. The Estimated Likelihood of Misconduct, Peer Effects 
 Individuals experiencing new peers 
 (1)    (2)   
VARIABLES GMM p 95% CI  IV PROBIT p 95% CI 
        
Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct 0.768*** <0.001 [0.461 - 1.075]  5.426*** <0.001 [4.048 - 6.803] 
Gender (reference: Females)        
 Male 0.017*** <0.001 [0.013 - 0.020]  0.140*** <0.001 [0.102 - 0.178] 
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)        
 Police Constable 0.017*** <0.001 [0.009 - 0.025]  0.210*** <0.001 [0.128 - 0.291] 
 Police Sergeant 0.022*** <0.001 [0.013 - 0.031]  0.270*** <0.001 [0.178 - 0.361] 
 Inspector 0.019*** 0.001 [0.008 - 0.031]  0.254*** <0.001 [0.145 - 0.364] 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 0.016* 0.011 [0.004 - 0.028]  0.143 0.117 [-0.036 - 0.323] 
Business Group (reference: TP - Boroughs East)        
 TP - Boroughs North -0.001 0.852 [-0.010 - 0.008]  -0.005 0.845 [-0.057 - 0.047] 
 TP - Boroughs South 0.007 0.101 [-0.001 - 0.015]  0.038 0.116 [-0.009 - 0.085] 
 TP - Boroughs West 0.002 0.656 [-0.007 - 0.010]  0.013 0.603 [-0.037 - 0.064] 
 TP - Central -0.033** 0.005 [-0.056 - -0.010]     
 TP - Criminal Justice & Crime 0.006 0.164 [-0.003 - 0.015]  0.066* 0.021 [0.010 - 0.121] 
 TP - Westminster 0.006 0.389 [-0.007 - 0.018]  0.034 0.360 [-0.039 - 0.108] 
 Specialist Crime and Operations -0.006 0.253 [-0.016 - 0.004]  -0.053 0.168 [-0.127 - 0.022] 
 Specialist Operations -0.013~ 0.079 [-0.027 - 0.001]  -0.163** 0.007 [-0.281 - -0.045] 
 Other Business Group -0.001 0.938 [-0.015 - 0.014]  -0.204** 0.007 [-0.354 - -0.055] 
Length of service        
 Length of service (10 years) -0.013* 0.034 [-0.025 - -0.001]  -0.057 0.240 [-0.152 - 0.038] 
 Length of service (10 years)2 0.002 0.126 [-0.001 - 0.005]  -0.003 0.840 [-0.029 - 0.023] 
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4 (reference: Competent but development 
required +  
Not Yet Competent)  
       
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.038** 0.001 [-0.062 - -0.015]  -0.285*** <0.001 [-0.428 - -0.142] 
  Competent (at required standard) -0.035** 0.003 [-0.059 - -0.012]  -0.256*** <0.001 [-0.392 - -0.120] 
        
Constant 0.038* 0.039 [0.002 - 0.074]  -1.606*** <0.001 [-1.753 - -1.459] 
        
Observations 80,632    80,612   
Number of individuals 30,627    30,617   
LM test statistic for under identification (Kleibergen-Paap)  199.3 <0.001      
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 97.75       
Hansen Statistic 0.520 0.471      
Degrees freedom of Hansen Statistic 1       
Wald test of endogeneity,   (1)     29.97 <0.001  
Quarter FEs YES    YES   
Year FEs YES    YES   
Note. The table shows full inferential statistics for the estimates presented in Table 2. All models estimate the probability of an event of misconduct in quarter   conditional on a 
set of covariates. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when at least one event of misconduct is reported in quarter  . The independent variable of interest is the 
proportion of peers in quarter   − 1 with reported cases of misconduct. Our identification strategy exploits the variation in peer groups experienced by the individuals during the 
period 2011-2014. We use instrumental variable techniques for the identification of peer effects. Model 1 presents a 2-step GMM linear model and Model 2, an IV PROBIT 
model. Two instruments are used for identification: the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in   − 2 and, likewise, the average proportion of 
peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in   − 3. The models include dummy controls to account for seasonal variation in the report of misconduct events: Quarter FE and 
year FE correspond to quarter dummies and year dummies. The first stage results of Model 1 are displayed in Supplementary Table 5. 95% confidence intervals using standard 
errors clustered by individuals in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10.
Supplementary Table 5. Peer Effects on the Likelihood of Misconduct - First Stage GMM 
 Individuals experiencing new peers 
 (1)   
VARIABLES GMM p 95% CI 
    
Instrument 1 0.048*** <0.001 [0.040 - 0.057] 
Instrument 2 0.028*** <0.001 [0.020 - 0.036] 
Gender (reference: Females)    
 Male 0.003*** <0.001 [0.002 - 0.005] 
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)    
 Police Constable 0.022*** <0.001 [0.020 - 0.024] 
 Police Sergeant 0.020*** <0.001 [0.017 - 0.023] 
 Inspector 0.016*** <0.001 [0.011 - 0.021] 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent -0.001 0.691 [-0.007 - 0.005] 
Business Group 
(reference: TP - Boroughs East)    
 TP - Boroughs North <0.001 0.833 [-0.003 - 0.004] 
 TP - Boroughs South 0.002 0.345 [-0.002 - 0.005] 
 TP - Boroughs West -0.002 0.214 [-0.006 - 0.001] 
 TP - Central -0.018~ 0.098 [-0.039 - 0.003] 
 TP - Criminal Justice & Crime -0.013*** <0.001 [-0.017 - -0.010] 
 TP - Westminster <0.001 0.977 [-0.005 - 0.006] 
 Specialist Crime and Operations -0.025*** <0.001 [-0.028 - -0.022] 
 Specialist Operations -0.039*** <0.001 [-0.042 - -0.036] 
 Other Business Group -0.039*** <0.001 [-0.043 - -0.036] 
Length of service    
 Length of service (10 years) -0.022*** <0.001 [-0.026 - -0.017] 
 Length of service (10 years)2 0.004*** <0.001 [0.003 - 0.005] 
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required +  
Not Yet Competent)  
   
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.012* 0.010 [-0.022 - -0.003] 
  Competent (at required standard) -0.005 0.342 [-0.014 - 0.005] 
    
Constant 0.079*** <0.001 [0.069 - 0.089] 
    
Observations 80,632   
Number of individuals 30,627   
LM test statistic for under identification (Kleibergen-Paap)  199.3 <0.001  
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 97.75   
Quarter FEs YES   
Year FEs YES   
Note. The regression displays the first stage results of Model 1 in Table 2. The dependent variable is the 
proportion of peers in quarter   − 1 with reported cases of misconduct. Two instruments are used for 
identification: the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in   − 2 and, likewise, the 
average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in   − 3. 95% confidence intervals using 
standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ 
p<0.10. 
Supplementary Table 6. Estimated Likelihood of Misconduct, Peer Effects: Falsification Test 
 DV:  Prop. of former peers in   − 2 with cases of misconduct in     DV: Misconduct in   
 (1)   (2)   (3)     (4)   
VARIABLES GMM p 95% CI GMM p 95% CI GMM p 95% CI  VARIABLES GMM p 95% CI 
               
Prop. of peers in   −1 with misconduct 0.162 0.235 [-0.105 - 0.428] 0.156 0.308 [-0.144 - 0.456] 0.132 0.393 [-0.171 - 0.436]  Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct 0.802* 0.020 [0.124 - 1.480] 
Gender (reference:  Prop. of Females)           Gender [reference: Females]    
  Prop. of Males 0.018*** <0.001 [0.011 - 0.024] 0.018*** <0.001 [0.011 - 0.026] 0.018*** <0.001 [0.010 - 0.025]   Male 0.014** 0.001 [0.005 - 0.022] 
Employee type (reference:  Prop. of Civil Staff)           Employee type [reference: Civil Staff]    
  Prop. of Police Constable 0.027*** <0.001 [0.019 - 0.036] 0.029*** <0.001 [0.018 - 0.039] 0.030*** <0.001 [0.019 - 0.040]   Police Constable 0.015~ 0.074 [-0.001 - 0.031] 
  Prop. of Police Sergeant 0.027*** <0.001 [0.018 - 0.036] 0.031*** <0.001 [0.020 - 0.042] 0.034*** <0.001 [0.022 - 0.045]   Police Sergeant 0.026*** <0.001 [0.012 - 0.041] 
  Prop. of Inspector 0.015** 0.009 [0.004 - 0.026] 0.021** 0.003 [0.007 - 0.034] 0.025*** 0.001 [0.011 - 0.038]   Inspector 0.019* 0.037 [0.001 - 0.038] 
   Prop. of Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
  Chief Superintendent 0.025** 0.004 [0.008 - 0.042] 0.022* 0.032 [0.002 - 0.042] 0.026* 0.012 [0.006 - 0.046]  
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 0.017~ 0.090 [-0.003 - 0.036] 
  Prop. of Special Constabulary -0.049*** <0.001 [-0.061 - -0.037] -0.068*** <0.001 [-0.094 - -0.042] -0.067*** <0.001 [-0.092 - -0.042]  Special Constabulary    
Business Group 
(reference:  Prop. in TP - Boroughs East)           Business Group [reference: TP - Boroughs East]    
  Prop. in TP - Boroughs North -0.004 0.314 [-0.011 - 0.004] -0.009* 0.048 [-0.018 - -0.000] -0.009~ 0.057 [-0.018 - 0.000]   TP - Boroughs North -0.001 0.883 [-0.018 - 0.015] 
  Prop. in TP - Boroughs South 0.006~ 0.099 [-0.001 - 0.013] 0.005 0.226 [-0.003 - 0.013] 0.005 0.194 [-0.003 - 0.014]   TP - Boroughs South 0.001 0.911 [-0.014 - 0.016] 
  Prop. in TP - Boroughs West -0.006 0.112 [-0.013 - 0.001] -0.007 0.160 [-0.016 - 0.003] -0.007 0.128 [-0.016 - 0.002]   TP - Boroughs West 0.001 0.888 [-0.015 - 0.017] 
  Prop. in TP - Central -0.011 0.555 [-0.048 - 0.026] -0.026 0.336 [-0.078 - 0.027] -0.022 0.430 [-0.075 - 0.032]   TP - Central -0.029* 0.024 [-0.054 - -0.004] 
  Prop. in TP - Criminal Justice & Crime -0.006 0.235 [-0.015 - 0.004] -0.009~ 0.085 [-0.019 - 0.001] -0.009~ 0.084 [-0.019 - 0.001]   TP - Criminal Justice & Crime 0.011 0.259 [-0.008 - 0.029] 
  Prop. in TP - Westminster 0.007 0.238 [-0.005 - 0.019] 0.007 0.371 [-0.008 - 0.021] 0.007 0.346 [-0.007 - 0.021]   TP - Westminster 0.020 0.117 [-0.005 - 0.045] 
  Prop. in Specialist Crime and Operations -0.028*** <0.001 [-0.037 - -0.019] -0.030*** <0.001 [-0.040 - -0.020] -0.029*** <0.001 [-0.039 - -0.019]   Specialist Crime and Operations -0.002 0.847 [-0.022 - 0.018] 
  Prop. in Specialist Operations -0.047*** <0.001 [-0.060 - -0.034] -0.049*** <0.001 [-0.064 - -0.034] -0.048*** <0.001 [-0.063 - -0.033]   Specialist Operations -0.005 0.729 [-0.034 - 0.024] 
  Prop. in Other Business Group -0.035*** <0.001 [-0.047 - -0.022] -0.037*** <0.001 [-0.051 - -0.023] -0.035*** <0.001 [-0.049 - -0.022]   Other Business Group 0.001 0.925 [-0.028 - 0.031] 
Length of service           Length of service    
 Average Length of service (10 years) -0.026*** <0.001 [-0.038 - -0.015] -0.034*** <0.001 [-0.048 - -0.020] -0.039*** <0.001 [-0.053 - -0.025]   Length of service [10 years] -0.022* 0.034 [-0.042 - -0.002] 
 Average Length of service (10 years)^2 0.003~ 0.065 [-0.000 - 0.007] 0.006** 0.009 [0.001 - 0.010] 0.007** 0.003 [0.002 - 0.011]   Length of service [10 years]2 0.004 0.115 [-0.001 - 0.010] 
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4   
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)            
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4  
[reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent]     
  Prop. of Exceptional + Competent (above standard)    -0.079*** 0.001 [-0.125 - -0.034] -0.080*** <0.001 [-0.125 - -0.035]    Exceptional + Competent [above standard] -0.048* 0.025 [-0.089 - -0.006] 
  Prop. of Competent (at required standard)    -0.072** 0.002 [-0.117 - -0.026] -0.071** 0.002 [-0.116 - -0.025]    Competent [at required standard] -0.041~ 0.050 [-0.083 - 0.000] 
               
Constant 0.057*** <0.001 [0.037 - 0.076] 0.136*** <0.001 [0.088 - 0.184] 0.146*** <0.001 [0.098 - 0.194]  Constant 0.054 0.104 [-0.011 - 0.118] 
               
Observations 27,040   19,796   19,796    Observations 20,374   
Number of individuals 18,506   14,111   14,111    Number of individuals 14,401   
               
LM test statistic for underidentification (Kleibergen-Paap) 52.51 <0.001  40.70 <0.001  39.53 <0.001   LM test statistic for under identification [Kleibergen-Paap] 35.16 <0.001  
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 25.39   19.62   19.09    F statistic for weak identification [Kleibergen-Paap] 16.98   
Hansen Statistic 3.135 0.077  3.486 0.062  3.889 0.049   Hansen Statistic 0.0304 0.862  
Degrees freedom of Hansen Statistic 1   1   1    Degrees freedom of Hansen Statistic 1   
Quarter FEs NO   NO   YES    Quarter FEs YES   
Year FEs NO   NO   YES    Year FEs YES   
Note. The table shows full inferential statistics for the results presented in Table 3. All models apply instrumental variable techniques for the identification of peer effects. Models 1 to 3 are part of a falsification test that study the behaviour of former peers of an individual   who moves to a different peer group in   − 1. The outcome 
constitutes the proportion of these peers who had reports of misconduct at time  . The independent variable of interest is the proportion of peers of   in   − 1 presenting incidence of misconduct. This variable is instrumented by two measures of conduct of peers of peers of  . By construction, these two measures are expected to have 
no influence on the outcome variable of these models. Model 4 is presented for comparative purposes and uses the standard outcome variable of the study, misconduct of   at time  . 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10. 
Supplementary Table 7. Peer Effects on the Likelihood of Misconduct - Line Manager Effects - Exhaustive Geographic Controls 
 Individuals experiencing new peers 
 (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)   
VARIABLES GMM p 95% CI   IV PROBIT p 95% CI   GMM p 95% CI  IV PROBIT p 95% CI 
                  
Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct 0.731*** <0.001 [0.397 - 1.066]   5.276*** <0.001 [3.708 - 6.844]   0.687*** <0.001 [0.381 - 0.994]  4.985*** <0.001 [3.456 - 6.514] 
Gender (reference: Females)                  
 Male 0.017*** <0.001 [0.013 - 0.020]   0.143*** <0.001 [0.104 - 0.182]   0.016*** <0.001 [0.013 - 0.020]  0.140*** <0.001 [0.103 - 0.177] 
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)                  
 Police Constable 0.018*** <0.001 [0.010 - 0.026]   0.215*** <0.001 [0.130 - 0.299]   0.019*** <0.001 [0.012 - 0.026]  0.211*** <0.001 [0.134 - 0.289] 
 Police Sergeant 0.023*** <0.001 [0.014 - 0.032]   0.272*** <0.001 [0.181 - 0.364]   0.021*** <0.001 [0.013 - 0.029]  0.248*** <0.001 [0.165 - 0.331] 
 Inspector 0.020*** <0.001 [0.009 - 0.031]   0.258*** <0.001 [0.148 - 0.368]   0.017** 0.005 [0.005 - 0.029]  0.217*** <0.001 [0.103 - 0.331] 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 0.016* 0.010 [0.004 - 0.028]   0.141 0.125 [-0.039 - 0.322]   0.011 0.142 [-0.004 - 0.025]  0.087 0.457 [-0.142 - 0.316] 
 Special Constabulary           -0.012 0.174 [-0.029 - 0.005]  -0.270** 0.006 [-0.464 - -0.076] 
Length of service                  
 Length of service (10 years) -0.014* 0.026 [-0.026 - -0.002]   -0.062 0.205 [-0.159 - 0.034]   -0.015** 0.006 [-0.026 - -0.004]  -0.069 0.115 [-0.156 - 0.017] 
 Length of service (10 years)2 0.002 0.107 [-0.001 - 0.005]   -0.002 0.909 [-0.028 - 0.025]   0.002~ 0.085 [-0.000 - 0.005]  -0.004 0.764 [-0.028 - 0.021] 
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)                   
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.038** 0.001 [-0.062 - -0.015]   -0.288*** <0.001 [-0.433 - -0.143]          
  Competent (at required standard) -0.035** 0.003 [-0.058 - -0.012]   -0.259*** <0.001 [-0.396 - -0.121]          
Line Manager Performance Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)                  
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard)           -0.039~ 0.080 [-0.083 - 0.005]  -0.325* 0.027 [-0.612 - -0.037] 
  Competent (at required standard)           -0.038~ 0.087 [-0.082 - 0.006]  -0.318* 0.030 [-0.605 - -0.031] 
Constant 0.033~ 0.088 [-0.005 - 0.072]   -1.639*** <0.001 [-1.833 - -1.446]   0.036 0.182 [-0.017 - 0.089]  -1.612*** <0.001 [-1.926 - -1.297] 
                  
Observations 80,632     80,612     77,994    77,994   
Number of individuals 30,627     30,617     32,183    32,183   
LM test statistic for under identification (Kleibergen-Paap)  165.4 <0.001         183.1 <0.001      
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 80.98          90.24       
Hansen Statistic 0.653 0.419         0.492 0.483      
Degrees freedom of Hansen Statistic 1          1       
Wald test of endogeneity,   (1)      22.70 <0.001        22.29 <0.001  
Geographic FEs YES     YES     YES    YES   
Quarter FEs YES     YES     YES    YES   
Year FEs YES     YES     YES    YES   
Note. The models replicate the regression from Table 2 but including a large number of dummy controls for specific geographic fixed effects (FEs): 32 dummy variables distinguishing 32 Borough Operational Command Units.  Geographic FEs also include dummy 
variables for specific subgroups of Territorial Policing (TP): TP - Central, TP - Westminster, and 6 subgroups that are part of the TP - Criminal Justice & Crime (Met Detention, Met Prosecutions, RTPC - Roads and Transport Policing Com, TP - Capability and 
Support, TP Crime Recording Investigation Bureau, and TP Crime Recording Investigation Bureau). As in earlier specifications (Tables 2 and 3), our models also incorporate dummy variables for individuals working in the Directorates Specialist Crime and Operations 
and Specialist Operations. Observe that Models 1 and 2 incorporate controls for the individual performance in quarter   − 4 and Models 3 and 4, for the performance of the line manager. These performance scores are reported on annual basis in Performance 
Development Reviews and evaluate competences in operational effectiveness, organizational influence, and resource management. Because the individual performance and his/her line manager performance are mutually determined, these controls are reported in 
different models. Sample sizes across models differ because of missing performance scores for a small subset of individuals or their line managers. 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** 
p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10. 
Supplementary Table 8. Peer Effects on the Likelihood of Misconduct - Line Manager Effects - Exhaustive Geographic Controls - First Stage 
GMM 
 
 
 Individuals experiencing new peers 
 (1)    (2)   
VARIABLES GMM p 95% CI  GMM p 95% CI 
        
Instrument 1 0.045*** <0.001 [0.037 - 0.054]  0.051*** <0.001 [0.042 - 0.060] 
Instrument 2 0.024*** <0.001 [0.016 - 0.032]  0.027*** <0.001 [0.018 - 0.035] 
Gender (reference: Females)        
 Male 0.003** 0.003 [0.001 - 0.004]  0.002* 0.025 [0.000 - 0.004] 
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)        
 Police Constable 0.020*** <0.001 [0.018 - 0.022]  0.019*** <0.001 [0.017 - 0.021] 
 Police Sergeant 0.016*** <0.001 [0.013 - 0.019]  0.013*** <0.001 [0.010 - 0.017] 
 Inspector 0.012*** <0.001 [0.007 - 0.017]  0.011*** <0.001 [0.006 - 0.017] 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent -0.004 0.198 [-0.009 - 0.002]  -0.004 0.236 [-0.012 - 0.003] 
 Special Constabulary     -0.048*** <0.001 [-0.051 - -0.045] 
Length of service        
 Length of service (10 years) -0.020*** <0.001 [-0.024 - -0.016]  -0.020*** <0.001 [-0.024 - -0.016] 
 Length of service (10 years)2 0.003*** <0.001 [0.002 - 0.005]  0.004*** <0.001 [0.003 - 0.005] 
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)         
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.011* 0.017 [-0.021 - -0.002]     
  Competent (at required standard) -0.004 0.374 [-0.014 - 0.005]     
Line Manager Performance Rating in   − 4  
 (reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)         
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard)     -0.006 0.468 [-0.021 - 0.010] 
  Competent (at required standard)     -0.001 0.891 [-0.017 - 0.014] 
        
Constant 0.068*** <0.001 [0.056 - 0.081]  0.071*** <0.001 [0.053 - 0.089] 
        
Observations 80,632    77,994   
Number of individuals 30,627    32,183   
LM test statistic for under identification (Kleibergen-Paap)  165.4 <0.001   183.1 <0.001  
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 80.98    90.24   
Geographic FEs YES    YES   
Quarter FEs YES    YES   
Year FEs YES    YES   
Note. The model reports the first stage results of the GMM regressions presented in Models 1 and 2 of Supplementary Table 7. 95% confidence intervals using standard errors 
clustered by individuals in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10. 
 
Supplementary Table 9. Peer Effects on the Likelihood of Misconduct - Difference Between Individuals Who Move to a New Peer Group and Individuals Who Have New Incoming Peers to Their Current 
Peer Group - Exhaustive Geographic Controls 
 Individuals who experience new peers 
 (A) Individuals moving to a different peer group  (B) Individuals with new incoming peers to their current peer group 
 (1)    (2)     (3)    (4)   
VARIABLES GMM p 95% CI  IV PROBIT p 95% CI   GMM p 95% CI  IV PROBIT p 95% CI 
                 
Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct 0.730* 0.049 [0.005 - 1.456]  4.920** 0.001 [1.913 - 7.928]   0.739*** <0.001 [0.364 - 1.115]  5.493*** <0.001 [3.665 - 7.321] 
Gender (reference: Females)                 
 Male 0.014*** 0.001 [0.006 - 0.022]  0.114** 0.006 [0.033 - 0.194]   0.018*** <0.001 [0.013 - 0.022]  0.153*** <0.001 [0.109 - 0.196] 
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)                 
 Police Constable 0.017* 0.035 [0.001 - 0.033]  0.197* 0.021 [0.030 - 0.364]   0.019*** <0.001 [0.009 - 0.028]  0.219*** <0.001 [0.121 - 0.316] 
 Police Sergeant 0.027*** <0.001 [0.013 - 0.041]  0.280*** 0.001 [0.120 - 0.439]   0.022*** <0.001 [0.011 - 0.033]  0.270*** <0.001 [0.159 - 0.380] 
 Inspector 0.019* 0.033 [0.002 - 0.037]  0.208* 0.029 [0.021 - 0.395]   0.021** 0.003 [0.007 - 0.035]  0.274*** <0.001 [0.140 - 0.408] 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 0.015 0.156 [-0.006 - 0.035]  0.056 0.719 [-0.247 - 0.359]   0.017* 0.024 [0.002 - 0.032]  0.186~ 0.077 [-0.020 - 0.393] 
Length of service                 
 Length of service (10 years) -0.021* 0.042 [-0.041 - -0.001]  -0.120 0.147 [-0.282 - 0.042]   -0.011 0.147 [-0.025 - 0.004]  -0.036 0.536 [-0.151 - 0.078] 
 Length of service (10 years)2 0.004 0.155 [-0.001 - 0.009]  0.012 0.613 [-0.034 - 0.058]   0.002 0.312 [-0.002 - 0.005]  -0.008 0.617 [-0.038 - 0.023] 
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required +  
Not Yet Competent)  
                
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.049* 0.020 [-0.090 - -0.008]  -0.320** 0.010 [-0.564 - -0.077]   -0.034* 0.023 [-0.063 - -0.005]  -0.273** 0.004 [-0.458 - -0.088] 
  Competent (at required standard) -0.042* 0.044 [-0.083 - -0.001]  -0.263* 0.023 [-0.490 - -0.036]   -0.032* 0.029 [-0.060 - -0.003]  -0.253** 0.005 [-0.430 - -0.077] 
                 
Constant 0.032 0.382 [-0.040 - 0.105]  -1.611*** <0.001 [-2.011 - -1.212]   0.031 0.185 [-0.015 - 0.077]  -1.663*** <0.001 [-1.897 - -1.429] 
                 
Observations 20,374    20,364     60,258    60,248   
Number of individuals 14,401    14,395     27,895    27,887   
LM test statistic for under identification (Kleibergen-Paap)  29.68 <0.001        139.2 <0.001      
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 14.33         68.51       
Hansen Statistic 0.0336 0.855        1.116 0.291      
Degrees freedom of Hansen Statistic 1         1       
Wald test of endogeneity,   (1)     5.401 0.020        17.76 <0.001  
Geographic FEs YES    YES     YES    YES   
Quarter FEs YES    YES     YES    YES   
Year FEs YES    YES     YES    YES   
Note. All models estimate the probability of an event of misconduct in quarter   conditional on a set of covariates. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when at least one event of misconduct is reported in quarter  . The independent 
variable of interest is the proportion of peers in quarter   − 1 with reported cases of misconduct. Our identification strategy exploits the variation in peer groups experienced by the individuals during the period 2011-2014. Models 1 and 2 
correspond to the sample of individuals who joined a new peer group. Models 3 and 4 correspond to the sample of individuals who had incoming new member to their current peer group. We use instrumental variable techniques for the 
identification of peer effects. Models 1 and 3 present 2-step GMM linear models and Models 2 and 4 present IV PROBIT models. Two instruments are used for identification: the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct 
in   − 2 and, likewise, the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in   − 3. The first stage results of Models 1 and 3 are displayed in Supplementary Table 10. The models include a large number of dummy controls for 
specific fixed effects (FE). Quarter FE and year FE correspond to quarter dummies and year dummies that account for seasonal variation in the report of misconduct events. Geographic FEs include 32 dummies distinguishing 32 Borough 
Operational Command Units.  Geographic FEs also include dummy variables for specific subgroups of Territorial Policing (TP): TP - Central, TP - Westminster, and 6 subgroups that are part of the TP - Criminal Justice & Crime (Met Detention, 
Met Prosecutions, RTPC - Roads and Transport Policing Com, TP - Capability and Support, TP Crime Recording Investigation Bureau, and TP Crime Recording Investigation Bureau). As in earlier specifications, we also incorporate dummies for 
individuals working in the Directorates Specialist Crime and Operations and Specialist Operations. 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ 
p<0.10. 
Supplementary Table 10. Peer Effects on the Likelihood of Misconduct - Difference Between Individuals Who Move to a Different Peer Group and 
Individuals Who Have New Incoming Peers to Their Current Peer Group - Exhaustive Geographic Controls - First Stage 
 (A) Individuals moving to a different peer 
group  
(B) Individuals with new incoming peers to 
their current peer group 
 (1)    (2)   
VARIABLES GMM p 95% CI  IV PROBIT p 95% CI 
        
Instrument 1 0.043*** <0.001 [0.023 - 0.062]  0.046*** <0.001 [0.037 - 0.055] 
Instrument 2 0.024* 0.015 [0.005 - 0.044]  0.023*** <0.001 [0.015 - 0.032] 
Gender (reference: Females)        
 Male 0.005** 0.004 [0.002 - 0.009]  0.001 0.156 [-0.001 - 0.003] 
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)        
 Police Constable 0.017*** <0.001 [0.012 - 0.022]  0.021*** <0.001 [0.019 - 0.023] 
 Police Sergeant 0.006~ 0.082 [-0.001 - 0.012]  0.020*** <0.001 [0.017 - 0.024] 
 Inspector 0.001 0.831 [-0.009 - 0.011]  0.016*** <0.001 [0.010 - 0.021] 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 
-0.015** 0.005 [-0.025 - -0.004]  0.001 0.853 [-0.006 - 0.007] 
Length of service        
 Length of service (10 years) -0.005 0.256 [-0.015 - 0.004]  -0.025*** <0.001 [-0.029 - -0.020] 
 Length of service (10 years)2 -0.000 0.992 [-0.003 - 0.003]  0.005*** <0.001 [0.003 - 0.006] 
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)  
       
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.005 0.564 [-0.022 - 0.012]  -0.015** 0.010 [-0.026 - -0.003] 
  Competent (at required standard) -0.001 0.875 [-0.018 - 0.016]  -0.006 0.265 [-0.017 - 0.005] 
        
Constant 0.062*** <0.001 [0.035 - 0.089]  0.072*** <0.001 [0.057 - 0.087] 
        
Observations 20,374    60,258   
Number of individuals 14,401    27,895   
LM test statistic for under identification (Kleibergen-Paap)  29.68  <0.001   139.2 <0.001  
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 14.33    68.51   
Geographic FEs YES    YES   
Quarter FEs YES    YES   
Year FEs YES    YES   
Note. The model reports the first stage results of the GMM regressions presented in Models 1 and 3 of Supplementary Table 9. Two instruments are used for identification: the 
average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in   − 2 and, likewise, the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in   − 3. 95% 
confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10.  
Supplementary Table 11. Peer Effects on the Likelihood of Misconduct - Peer Group Size Effects - Exhaustive Geographic Controls 
 (1)    (2)   
VARIABLES GMM p 95% CI  IV PROBIT p 95% CI 
        
Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct 0.585** 0.008 [0.153 - 1.016]  4.606*** 0.001 [2.005 - 7.207] 
Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct # Number of peers in   − 1 0.027 0.381 [-0.034 - 0.089]  0.128 0.540 [-0.282 - 0.539] 
Number of peers in   − 1 -0.001 0.440 [-0.005 - 0.002]  -0.006 0.625 [-0.030 - 0.018] 
Gender (reference: Females)        
 Male 0.017*** <0.001 [0.013 - 0.021]  0.141*** <0.001 [0.101 - 0.180] 
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)        
 Police Constable        
 Police Sergeant 0.019*** <0.001 [0.010 - 0.027]  0.216*** <0.001 [0.127 - 0.305] 
 Inspector 0.024*** <0.001 [0.015 - 0.034]  0.281*** <0.001 [0.183 - 0.378] 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 
0.022*** <0.001 [0.011 - 0.034]  0.273*** <0.001 [0.159 - 0.387] 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 
0.015* 0.023 [0.002 - 0.027]  0.139 0.142 [-0.046 - 0.324] 
Length of service        
 Length of service (10 years) -0.014* 0.045 [-0.027 - -0.000]  -0.065 0.228 [-0.170 - 0.040] 
 Length of service (10 years)2 0.003 0.122 [-0.001 - 0.006]  -<0.001 0.984 [-0.028 - 0.027] 
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)  
       
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.035** 0.004 [-0.059 - -0.011]  -0.262*** 0.001 [-0.411 - -0.113] 
  Competent (at required standard) -0.032** 0.008 [-0.055 - -0.008]  -0.232** 0.001 [-0.373 - -0.091] 
        
Constant 0.039~ 0.058 [-0.001 - 0.080]  -1.605*** <0.001 [-1.856 - -1.353] 
        
Observations 77,427    77,408   
Number of individuals 30,163    30,153   
LM test statistic for under identification (Kleibergen-Paap)  157.9 <0.001      
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 38.58       
Hansen Statistic 1.005 0.605      
Degrees freedom of Hansen Statistic 2       
Wald test of endogeneity,   (1)     22.99 <0.001  
Geographic FEs YES    YES   
Quarter FEs YES    YES   
Year FEs YES    YES   
Note. All models estimate the probability of an event of misconduct in quarter   conditional on a set of covariates. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when at 
least one event of misconduct is reported in quarter  . The independent variable of interest is the proportion of peers in quarter   − 1 with reported cases of misconduct. Our 
identification strategy exploits the variation in peer groups experienced by the individuals during the period 2011-2014. The models are similar to those in Supplementary Table 
7, Models 1 and 2. But we added an interaction between the endogenous variable (Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct) and the number of peers. We excluded observations 
above the 95-percentile of number of peers (more than 15 peers). We use instrumental variable techniques for the identification of peer effects. Model 1 presents 2-step GMM 
linear model and Model 2 presents an IV PROBIT model. Four instruments are used for identification: the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in 
  − 2, the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in   − 3, and the interaction of each of these variables with the number of peers in quarter   − 1 . 
The first stage results of Model 1 are displayed in Supplementary Table 12. The models include a large number of dummy controls for specific fixed effects (FE). Quarter FE 
and year FE correspond to quarter dummies and year dummies that account for seasonal variation in the report of misconduct events. Geographic FEs include 32 dummies 
distinguishing 32 Borough Operational Command Units.  Geographic FEs also include dummy variables for specific subgroups of Territorial Policing (TP): TP - Central, TP - 
Westminster, and 6 subgroups that are part of the TP - Criminal Justice & Crime (Met Detention, Met Prosecutions, RTPC - Roads and Transport Policing Com, TP - 
Capability and Support, TP Crime Recording Investigation Bureau, and TP Crime Recording Investigation Bureau). As in earlier specifications, we also incorporate dummies 
for individuals working in the Directorates Specialist Crime and Operations and Specialist Operations. 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by individuals 
in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10. 
Supplementary Table 12. Peer Effects on the Likelihood of Misconduct - Peer Group Size Effects - Exhaustive Geographic Controls - First Stage 
 DV= Prop. of peers in   − 1 with 
misconduct 
  DV=Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct # Number of 
peers in   − 1 
 
 (1)     (2)   
VARIABLES GMM p 95% CI   GMM p 95% CI 
         
Instrument 1 0.060*** <0.001 [0.037 - 0.083]   -0.031 0.553 [-0.132 - 0.071] 
Instrument 2 0.040*** 0.001 [0.017 - 0.063]   -0.233*** <0.001 [-0.332 - -0.134] 
Instrument 1 # Number of peers in   − 1 -0.002~ 0.094 [-0.005 - 0.000]   0.043*** <0.001 [0.025 - 0.061] 
Instrument 2 # Number of peers in   − 1 -0.003~ 0.075 [-0.005 - 0.000]   0.056*** <0.001 [0.038 - 0.074] 
Number of peers in   − 1 0.001*** <0.001 [0.001 - 0.001]   0.053*** <0.001 [0.051 - 0.055] 
Gender (reference: Females)         
 Male 0.003** 0.005 [0.001 - 0.004]   0.020** 0.001 [0.008 - 0.031] 
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)         
 Police Constable 0.020*** <0.001 [0.018 - 0.022]   0.128*** <0.001 [0.114 - 0.143] 
 Police Sergeant 0.017*** <0.001 [0.014 - 0.020]   0.105*** <0.001 [0.085 - 0.124] 
 Inspector 0.013*** <0.001 [0.008 - 0.018]   0.069*** <0.001 [0.042 - 0.095] 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 
-0.002 0.475 [-0.008 - 0.004]   0.034* 0.018 [0.006 - 0.063] 
Length of service         
 Length of service (10 years) -0.020*** <0.001 [-0.024 - -0.015]   -0.178*** <0.001 [-0.208 - -0.148] 
 Length of service (10 years)2 0.003*** <0.001 [0.002 - 0.005]   0.034*** <0.001 [0.026 - 0.042] 
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet 
Competent)  
        
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.013** 0.010 [-0.022 - -0.003]   -0.065* 0.025 [-0.122 - -0.008] 
  Competent (at required standard) -0.006 0.222 [-0.016 - 0.004]   -0.028 0.334 [-0.085 - 0.029] 
         
Constant 0.062*** <0.001 [0.049 - 0.076]   0.087* 0.040 [0.004 - 0.170] 
         
Observations 77,427     77,427   
Number of people 30,163     30,163   
LM test statistic for under identification (Kleibergen-Paap)  157.9 <0.001    157.9 <0.001  
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 38.58     38.58   
Geographic FEs YES     YES   
Quarter FEs YES     YES   
Year FEs YES     YES   
Note. The model reports the first stage results of the GMM regressions presented in Model 1 of Supplementary Table 11. Four instruments are used for identification: the 
average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in   − 2, the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in   − 3, and the interaction 
of each of these variables with the number of peers in quarter   − 1. 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. Significance levels: 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10.  
Supplementary Table 13. Likelihood of Switching Line Manager - Whole Data - Exhaustive Geographic Controls  
 (1)   (2)   (3)   
VARIABLES RE p 95% CI RE p 95% CI RE p 95% CI 
          
Complaint in previous semester =1 0.046*** <0.001 [0.038 - 0.053]       
Gender (reference: Females)          
 Male       -0.018*** <0.001 [-0.023 - -0.013] 
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)          
 Police Constable       0.086*** <0.001 [0.080 - 0.092] 
 Police Sergeant       0.121*** <0.001 [0.112 - 0.131] 
 Inspector       0.132*** <0.001 [0.118 - 0.146] 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 
      0.077*** <0.001 [0.056 - 0.099] 
Length of service          
 Length of service (10 years)       -0.065*** <0.001 [-0.078 - -0.053] 
 Length of service (10 years)2       0.009*** <0.001 [0.005 - 0.012] 
Employee Performance Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + 
Not Yet Competent)  
         
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard)    -0.036** 0.004 [-0.062 - -0.011]    
  Competent (at required standard)    -0.022~ 0.079 [-0.047 - 0.003]    
          
Constant 0.357*** <0.001 [0.355 - 0.360] 0.391*** <0.001 [0.366 - 0.415] 0.480*** <0.001 [0.454 - 0.505] 
          
Observations 195,363   195,363   195,363   
Number of individuals 35,923   35,923   35,923   
ICC 0.0615   0.0667   0.0372   
   0.118   0.124   0.0906   
          
Year FEs NO   NO   YES   
Geographic FEs NO   NO   YES   
Note. The model reports Random Effects (RE) regression estimates. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when an individual is assigned to a different line manager 
during semester  . Data observations are semi-annual since line managers changes are registered every six months. Model 1 shows the effects of a misconduct event during the 
preceding semester on the likelihood of a subsequent change in line manager. Model 2 shows the effects of past performance scores on the likelihood of a subsequent change in 
line manager. These performance scores are reported on annual basis in Performance Development Reviews and evaluate competences in operational effectiveness, 
organizational influence, and resource management. Because the individual performance and his/her incidents of misconducts are correlated, these controls are reported in 
different models. Model 3 shows the effects of demographic controls. 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered by individuals in brackets. Significance levels: 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ~ p<0.10.
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